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THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
TREATY INTERPRETATION:
THE DUAL TREATY APPROACH
Malvina Halberstam*
The debate over the effect to be given to legislative history in
determining the meaning of a statute has a counterpart in treaty inter
pretation. Treaties, like federal statutes, are the supreme law of the
land,' and must be interpreted and applied by the courts. The ques
tion of the effect to be given to legislative history is even more compli
cated, however, with respect to treaties than it is with respect to
statutes. To the various arguments for and against the use of legisla
tive history in statutory interpretation must be added the considera
tion that treaties are agreements with one or more foreign states and
are subject to international law.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.^

It further provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpreta
tion, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circum
stances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable.^

Since, under international law, resort may not be had to preparatory
materials at all (other than to confirm the plain meaning) except
where the treaty is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to an absurd
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. The author was formerly
Counselor on International Law and is a Consultant to the United States Department of State,
Office of the Legal Adviser. However, she has not done any work for the Department of State
on the ABM Treaty, the interpretation of the ABM Treaty, or the question of treaty interpre
tation in general. The views expressed herein are her own and may or may not be consistent
with those of the Department of State.
' U.S. CONST, art. VI.
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31,
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). The United States is not a party to the Conven
tion, but considers most of its provisions to be customary international law.
3 Id. art. 32.
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result, and even then United States legislative history would not be
considered part of the preparatory work, the use of legislative history
by United States courts to interpret a treaty may result in different
interpretations under United States and international law.
The question arose recently in the context of the Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems between the United
States and the Soviet Union (the ABM treaty).'^ Opponents of the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) argued that the development and
testing of the so-called Star Wars violated the ABM Treaty.' The
Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Abraham Sofaer, took the
position that the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty that would
bar SDI testing was not correct; that the negotiating history showed
that a narrower interpretation, which did not bar SDI, was correct.®
Proponents of the broader interpretation found a statement in the leg
islative history by a witness for the executive that supported their in
terpretation. They then argued that since the treaty clause requires
Senate advice and consent,"' the treaty, at least in so far as the United
States is concerned, must be interpreted as it was understood by the
Senate at the time of ratification, regardless of how it is interpreted
internationally. Therefore, they concluded, the broader interpretation
governs.®
The Senate's understanding, in the view of the proponents of this
position, need not be included as a condition in the resolution giving
the Senate's advice and consent to ratification; it may be determined
from the legislative history of the resolution. As one ardent propo
nent of this position put it:
Often, the Senate registers its understandings relatively informally,
with a comment in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings or
4 Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United States-USSR, 23
U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
5 See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the
ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986).
® According to the Legal Advisor, the negotiating history demonstrated that a United
States proposal, which would have barred Star Wars, was rejected by the Soviet Union.
Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972, 1978-80
(1986).

U.S. CONST, art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides that the President "shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur."
® See, e.g., The ABM Treaty and the Constitution, Joint Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 319 (1987)
[hereinafter ABM Treaty Hearings] (statement of Louis Henkin); Kennedy, Treaty Interpreta
tion by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 854, 877 (1986); Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinter
pretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1405; see also id. at 1420.
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markup, in the committee reports, or in floor debate, rather than in
the resolution of ratification. Occasionally, it is even necessary to
draw meaningful inferences from virtual silence.'
In United States v. Stuart,Justice Scalia took issue with that
approach. He wrote:
The question before us in a treaty case is what the two or
more sovereigns agreed to, rather than what a single one of them,
or the legislature of a single one of them, thought it agreed to. And
to answer that question accurately, it can reasonably be said,
whatever extra-textual materials are consulted must be materials
that reflect the mutual agreement (for example, the negotiating his
tory) rather than a unilateral understanding. Thus, we have de
clined to give effect, not merely to Senate debates and committee
reports, but even to an explicit condition of ratification adopted by
the full Senate, when the President failed to include that in his
ratification.
Of course the Senate has unquestioned power to enforce its
own understanding of treaties. It may, in the form of a resolution,
give its consent on the basis of conditions. If these are agreed to by
the President and accepted by the other contracting parties, they
become part of the treaty and of the law of the United States. . . .
Moreover, if Congress does not like the interpretation that a treaty
has been given by the courts or by the President, it may abrogate or
amend it as a matter of internal law by simply enacting inconsis
tent legislation. . . . But it is a far cry from all of this to say that
the meaning of a treaty can be determined, not by a reservation
attached to the President's ratification at the instance of the Senate,
nor even by formal resolution of the Senate unmentioned in the
President's ratification, but by legislative history of the sort that we
have become accustomed to using for {sic) purpose of determining
the meaning of domestic legislation."
Whatever one's views on the use of legislative history to interpret
statutes, it seems clear that Justice Scalia is correct in rejecting the use
of legislative history to interpret treaties, at least when such use will
result in an interpretation of the treaty domestically that is different
from its interpretation internationally. If the interpretation based on
legislative history is narrower, i.e., imposes lesser restrictions on what
the parties may do, the United States would be in breach of its obliga
tions internationally. The United States could not justify its failure to
comply with the broader interpretation of the treaty under intema' Koplow, supra note 8, at 1420.
10 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
'' Id. at 374-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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tional law on the ground that under United States law the treaty has
to be interpreted in light of the legislative history.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides:
1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by
a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its in
ternal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invali
dating its consent unless that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any
state conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal
practice and in good faith.
While the advice and consent requirement would probably qualify as
an "internal law of fundamental importance," an understanding of
the Senate would not be "objectively evident to any state conducting
itself... in accordance with normal practice," if that understanding
was not conveyed to the other state party, but had to be extrapolated
from a comment in committee "hearings or markup," from "commit
tee reports," the "floor debate," or inferred from "virtual silence."'^
If an interpretation based on legislative history is broader than
the international interpretation, i.e., imposes greater obligations on
the parties, then the United States would be subjecting itself to restric
tions on its conduct for which it would receive no reciprocal benefits.
Moreover, the use of a legislative history to impose obligations domes
tically that the United States does not have internationally would also
violate the United States Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Chadha.^* Since a treaty is an agreement between two or more states,
an obligation that is, by hypothesis, not part of the United States'
obligations internationally, cannot be United States law as part of the
treaty." The additional obligation imposed under the broad interpre
ts Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 2, art. 46.
13 See supra text accompanying note 9.
i"! 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The Court in Chadha made it clear that the only constitutional
process for creating domestic law is by vote of a majority of both houses of Congress signed by
the President, or by a two-thirds vote of both houses overriding a Presidential veto. In
Chadha, the Court held that Congress cannot circumvent those requirements even to recap
ture power it has delegated to the executive, even though it specifically so provided in the
legislation delegating the power to the executive and made it a condition of such delegation.
Moreover, the Court so held even though it was a process that Congress had used for many
years as a means of controlling the power it delegated to the executive.
15 This point is discussed in greater depth in a paper by the author entitled A Treaty is a
Treaty is a Treaty, presented at a Conference on Separation of Powers and the Debate About
Treaty Interpretation Under the Constitution, held in Washington, D.C., March 15-16, 1990.
The papers presented at this Conference are presently being edited for publication by Profeswr
John Norton Moore at the University of Virginia. A copy of the author's paper is on file with
the Cardozo Law Review.
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tation has, however, not been voted on by both houses of Congress
even in the sense that legislative history in a statute can be viewed as
having been voted on—^because only the Senate gives its advice and
consent to a treaty. Indeed, that is the position the Supreme Court
took almost a century ago in New York Indians v. United States. In
that case the Court refused to give effect to a condition that the Senate
had included in its advise and consent resolution, but that the Presi
dent failed to convey to the Indian Tribe. The Court said:
[W]hile this proviso was adopted by the Senate, there is no evi
dence that it ever received the sanction or approval of the Presi
dent. It cannot be considered as a legislative act, since the power
to legislate is vested in the President, Senate and House of
Representatives.^''

The use of legislative history to justify a domestic interpretation
of a treaty that differs from its interpretation internationally would
also have other undesirable consequences. It would undermine the
purpose of the advice and consent requirement, which was intended
as a limitation on the executive's power to bind the United States in
ternationally. It is argued in support of the dual treaty approach that
the legislative history rather than the negotiating history—which may
be considered in interpreting the treaty under international law
should be controlling domestically because it would be too burden
some for the Senate to keep informed of the negotiating history, and
that an understanding'® on every point the Senate considers important
would make the treaty unmanageable.'' But surely, the purpose of
the constitutional requirement that the Senate give its advice and con
sent to treaties was not to ensure that domestic law comports with the
Senate's understanding but, rather, to ensure that the United States
does not bind itself internationally to that which the Senate considers
objectionable. The justification for the dual treaty approach relieves
the Senate of that responsibility. Thus, under the dual treaty ap
proach, the Senate would abdicate the very function that the advise
and consent requirement was designed to serve.
Where the legislative history results in an interpretation that is
16 170 U.S. 1 (1898).
11 Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
.
18 The Senate could, of course, ensure that its view of the treaty is controlling on any ^int
by
an appropriate reservation or understanding on that point to the resolution giving
the Senate's advice and consent to ratification.
r.
j an.
19 See, e.g.. Glennon, Interpreting "Interpretation": The President.
Treaty Interpretation Becomes Treaty Making, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 913, 919-20 (198^,
reprinted in ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 8, at 827-28; see also Glennon,
n.l6, reprinted in ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 8, at 828 n.l6 (citing unpublished testi
mony of Senator Nunn in support of that position).
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narrower, i.e., more permissive, than the interpretation internation
ally, the United States would be in breach of its international obliga
tions. Thus, the dual treaty approach would also undermine the very
purpose of the supremacy clause, which was to make the obligations
that the United States undertakes internationally binding
domestically.
The dual treaty approach would also impose contradictory obli
gations on the Executive. On the one hand, he is required to give
effect to United States obligations under international law, which, of
course, include treaty obligations. On the other hand, he would be
bound by the treaty as understood by the Senate, even if that breaches
international law. Such contradictory obligations may also arise
under a unitary treaty approach if Congress enacts superseding legis
lation or a court holds a treaty to be unconstitutional. But that is
done after deliberation by Congress, or adjudication by a court, as the
case may be. Here, the President would be required to breach inter
national law automatically, without anyone deciding that the treaty's
application as understood by the Senate at the time of ratification is of
supervening importance, or that the treaty as interpreted internation
ally violates fundamental principles of United States jurisprudence.
Even if one considers legislative history helpful in statutory inter
pretation (a question on which I take no position in this paper), it
would seem obvious that "a comment in the . . . Committee hearings
or markup, in the committee reports, or in floor debate" should not
be the basis for United States violation of its obligations
internationally.^®
Professor Vagts takes Justice Scalia to task for his statement in
Stuart that he was "unable to discover a single case in which [the
Supreme] Court has consulted the Senate debate, committee hearings
or committee reports"^' to interpret a treaty, proceeds to list a
number of cases in which legislative history was used in treaty inter
pretation, and offers some research guidance on how those cases could
have been found.^^ None of these cases, however, rely on legislative
history to support an interpretation of the treaty that is contrary to,
or differs from, the meaning of the treaty as determined by reference
to the negotiating history. Nor has research, following Professor
Vagts's suggestions, disclosed a case in which a court relied on legisla
tive history of a treaty to impose obligations domestically that were
20 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
22 Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme
Court, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1989).
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not required by the treaty as interpreted internationally.^^
Whatever one's views on the extent to which legislative history
should be used in determining the meaning of a statute, legislative
history should not be used to interpret a treaty so as to impose diflFerent obligations on the United States domestically and internationally.
If Congress beheves the United States should not engage in conduct
permitted by a treaty, it should pass legislation prohibiting such con
duct. Conversely, if the United States decides not to abide by its in
ternational obligations, that decision should be made consciously and
deliberately, by the President, or by Congress through legislation, not
by reference to legislative history.
23 While Justice Scalia's statement quoted by Professor Vagts was not so limited, that
clearly was the issue in the ABM controversy (i.e., whether the legislative or negotiating his
tory was controlling), and the issue to which both Justice Scalia s statement in his concurring
opinion and Justice Brennan's statements in a footnote to the majority opinion in Stuart, were
clearly addressed Thus, Justice Brennan, disagreeing with Justice Scalia said:
A treaty's negotiating history, which JUSTICE SCALIA suggests would be a bet
ter interpretive guide than preratification Senate materials, . . . would in fact be a
worse indicator of a treaty's meaning, for that history is rarely a matter of public
record available to the Senate when it decides to grant or withhold its consent.
Stuart, 489 U.S. at 368 n.7.

